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An information network of ofﬁcials? Dissecting the
role and nature of the network of parliamentary
representatives in the European Parliament
Christine Neuhold and Anna-Lena Högenauer
ABSTRACT
Enhancing the role of national parliaments in the European Union’s decision-
making process has for some time been a popular way in which policy-
makers have sought to address legitimacy problems in the European Union,
the Early Warning Mechanism being only one example. In response to these
developments, an increasing number of scholars have addressed the question
of how parliaments make use of these powers in practice. An important
dimension of the process – the role of parliamentary ofﬁcials in parliamentary
scrutiny and control – has so far been neglected in the literature. Against this
background, this article examines the role of the representatives of national
parliaments in the European Parliament with the aim of understanding the
role and the nature of this ‘bureaucratic network’. While falling short of an
epistemic community, these ofﬁcials play an important role in enabling
parliamentary scrutiny through the dissemination of information.
KEYWORDS Parliament; Europeanisation; bureaucratisation; administration; inter-parliamentary
cooperation; parliamentary scrutiny
Introduction
National parliaments have undergone a remarkable change within the Euro-
pean Union (EU) system of multi-level governance.1 From political players
that had largely been sidelined by way of treaty reform, the Treaty of
Lisbon has now upgraded the role of national parliaments in the EU by fore-
seeing a number of mechanisms through which national parliaments are to
‘contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union’ (Article 12 Treaty
on the European Union (TEU)). A series of provisions are thus foreseen in
the treaty and its protocols in order to strengthen the powers of national par-
liaments within the EU system of multi-level governance. A cornerstone in
this context is the mechanism of subsidiarity control, which is commonly
known as the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM).
Little is known, however, on how parliaments will actuallymake use of the
treaty provisions (for exceptions see, e.g. Cooper, 2012; Hefftler, Neuhold,
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Rozenberg, & Smith, 2015; Kiiver, 2012) and an important dimension of the
process – the role of parliamentary ofﬁcials – has until recently been neglected
in the literature. Yet, in practice, parliamentary administrations play a crucial
role in the transmission and processing of information in the context of scru-
tiny of EU affairs (cf. Högenauer & Neuhold, 2015). The requirement for
national parliaments to cooperate systematically with one another and the
need to develop a high level of technical and legal expertise have led to the
emergence of a network of permanent representatives of national parliaments
in the European Parliament (EP), or as they are called in the practical political
process, ‘liaison ofﬁcers’ (Mastenbroek et al., 2014). Despite the fact that this
network has expanded rapidly over the past decade, it has up to now received
little academic attention. In this vein, we want to shed light on two questions
that are very much interlinked: what is the actual role of the liaison ofﬁcers in
implementing the Lisbon provisions, and how we can we grasp the functions
and nature of such a network analytically? The analytical characterisation of
the network is important as different conceptualisations have different impli-
cations on the way actors are (seen to be) able to affect the EU policy-making
process. In order to shed light on this issue, the article will thus set out to
analyse the functions and activities of the liaison ofﬁcers. Methodologically,
this article builds on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with
liaison ofﬁcers from 20 member states over the period 2010–13.2 This infor-
mation has been supplemented by questionnaires submitted to experts
working on national parliaments.3 By way of this data collection, all 28
member states have been covered.
After examining the main changes of Lisbon and its implications for
national parliaments, the analytical framework reviews potential concepts
to capture the work of liaison ofﬁcers of national parliaments. Then the func-
tioning of the network of liaison ofﬁcers in the practical political process is
analysed. In the concluding section we reﬂect on the nature and signiﬁcance
of the network in the context of the implementation of the Lisbon provisions
on national parliaments.
Powers of parliamentary control after the Treaty of Lisbon
The debate on the democratic deﬁcit of the EU has led to renewed interest in
the possible role of national parliaments within the EU institutional frame-
work within academia and at the political level (cf. Hefftler et al., 2015). In
particular, the Lisbon Treaty upgrades the role of national parliaments
within the European legal order. For the ﬁrst time ever, a treaty article men-
tions the monitoring of EU institutions as a mechanism by way of which
national parliaments are to contribute to the good functioning of the EU
(Article 12 TEU). Further treaty provisions and the protocols on the role of
national parliaments in the EU and on the application of the principles of
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subsidiarity and proportionality specify the scope of the participation of
national parliaments in EU decision-making.
First, the information rights of national parliaments are strengthened with
regard to legislative documents. Second, the protocol on the role of national
parliaments stipulates that national parliaments are to be informed in the
case of a transition from unanimity to qualiﬁed majority or from a special
to the ordinary legislative procedure under the so-called ‘passerelle clause’.
National parliaments shall be informed at least six months before such a
decision is adopted and every parliament has veto powers. Third, compliance
with the principle of subsidiarity is to be ensured through a mechanism, which
is commonly referred to as the ‘Early Warning Mechanism’. The protocol on
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality states that
all the draft legislative acts sent to national parliaments shall contain a detailed
statement that makes it possible to appraise the compliance with these prin-
ciples. Accordingly, any national parliament or any chamber of a national
parliament may, within eight weeks of the date of transmission of a legislative
act, send to the presidents of the EP, the Council and the Commission a
reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does
not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Each national parliament has
two votes and in the case of bicameral systems, each of the two chambers
has one vote. In this context two procedures commonly referred to as
‘yellow and orange cards procedures’ form one of the cornerstones of the
treaty when it comes to parliamentary control. The ‘yellow’ card procedure
consists of the following: where reasoned opinions on a non-compliance of
a draft legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least
one-third of all the votes allocated to national parliaments, the draft must
be reviewed.4 After such review, the institution that has put forward the pro-
posal may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. Reasons must be
given for whichever decision is taken.
The ‘orange’ card procedure states that under the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure the draft legislative act must be reviewed if the reasoned opinions
regarding subsidiarity represent at least a simple majority of the votes allo-
cated to national parliaments. After this review, the Commission may
decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal (Kiiver, 2012).
However, if, by a majority of 55 per cent of the members of the Council or
a simple majority of the votes cast in the EP, the legislators are of the
opinion that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity,
no further consideration will be given to it (COSAC, 2008). Moreover,
national parliaments can participate in the request for ﬁling an action for
annulment before the Court of Justice of the European Union on grounds
of a breach of the principle of subsidiarity.
Finally, it is foreseen that national parliaments are to play an increased role
in the inter-parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments and
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with the EP. In this context the role of the Conference of Community and
European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union
(COSAC) is stressed (Kiiver, 2012). Owing to the fact that the thresholds
for the ‘cards’ under the EWM are high and the deadlines are tight, there
has to be some coordination among national legislatures in order to be able
to have an impact under the EWM. Moreover, in order for the orange card
to be raised this means that some form of coordination either with the
Council or the EP has to be in place in order to be able to resort to the mech-
anisms effectively. This is where the network of parliamentary ofﬁcials can
play a crucial role.
Analytical framework
While we can build on a growing host of literature when it comes to the role of
national parliaments holding the executive to account in EU affairs (Maurer &
Wessels, 2001; O’Brennan & Raunio, 2007), the literature on parliamentary
administrations in EU member states is thus far mainly descriptive and
rather limited. The main insights relate to the political neutrality of adminis-
trators, for example in the French system and in the British parliamentary
administrative system (Baron, 2013; Campbell & Laporte, 1981; Perez,
2007; Ryle, 1981). There is a large host of literature on the phenomenon of
delegation to bureaucratic agencies by elected members of the US Congress,
reaching from attempts to control a (possible) run-away democracy (Lowi,
1979) by way of administrative laws (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).
Networking of parliamentary ofﬁcials across national borders has thus far
been neglected in the academic debate, possibly because it is a recent phenom-
enon. Nevertheless, there are two concepts that can potentially capture the key
aspects of the work of liaison ofﬁcers of national parliaments.
First, one could conceive that liaison ofﬁcers form what we would coin an
information network, i.e. a network that collects and exchanges information
with a view to optimising the collective knowledge of national parliaments.
The role of information is salient with regard to a bureaucratic network, as
it is the traditional resource of inﬂuence for bureaucracies (Peters, 2001,
p. 234). This conceptualisation departs from the assumption that twentieth
century societies have shifted away from a command and control style of gov-
ernment towards increased deliberation and bargaining where information
and knowledge are a key resource (cf. Blom, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 2001,
p. 5). This dynamic is particularly prominent in the context of the EU and
for questions of parliamentary scrutiny, because information-asymmetries
are seen to privilege Brussels-based actors and executives rather than parlia-
ments (O’Brennan & Raunio, 2007). Especially now that national parliaments
are meant to play a more active role within the EU policy-making process,
information processing plays an important ‘enabling function’. We are
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particularly interested in what Blom calls the ‘operational politics’ of inform-
ing, i.e. how the liaison ofﬁcers actually gather and exchange information
through different forms of interaction (Blom, 2014).
What would make the network of liaison ofﬁcers an information network,
according to the criteria of Blom, would be a high level of experience in the
ﬁeld. Moreover, the respective ofﬁcials would interact regularly on a formal
and informal level and focus speciﬁcally on information gathering, interpret-
ation and exchange. Moreover, these ofﬁcials would have a close relationship
with their own national parliament from which they would also receive infor-
mation (e.g. mandates, updates on priorities, updates on activities) and to
which they would send information about other parliaments and inform
them of the positions of EU institutions. Accordingly, the network of
liaison ofﬁcers would collectively constitute the ‘hub of information
trading’, where each individual liaison ofﬁcer could be seen as constituting
a ‘hub of information exchange’ between his or her institution, other parlia-
ments and the European arena. This concept is relatively unproblematic in
terms of a potential bureaucratisation of parliamentary politics. In this scen-
ario, liaison ofﬁcers would be primarily guided by the interests of their
sending institutions (in this case national parliaments) and stick closely to
their mandate.
Alternatively, the concept of epistemic communitiesmight be instructive in
order to be able to conceptualise the network of liaison ofﬁcers. The concept
was originally developed in the context of international policy coordination.
Epistemic communities have been described as a ‘network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain’ and as
having ‘an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3).
While they share many features with information networks, what is crucial
is the fact that the professionals making up epistemic communities have a
shared set of normative and principled beliefs, shared notions of validity
and a set of common practices associated with a set of problems and policy
issues (Clemens & Cook, 1999, p. 446; Haas, 1992, p. 5). In the context of
the role of government representatives in EU treaty reform, Reh adds to
these dimensions issue-relevant expertise, experience in negotiating interna-
tionally and effective preparation, including access to information on
ongoing negotiations (Reh, 2007, p. 1189).
The implications of an epistemic community are, moreover, which is also
key, that its members ‘go native’, i.e. that their actions are no longer deter-
mined exclusively by the sending institution, but are also to some extent inﬂu-
enced by a feeling of solidarity with the ‘group’. In the EU context, this
phenomenon has so far mainly been identiﬁed with regard to government
ofﬁcials in Council working groups. Regular meetings between government
ofﬁcials are seen to contribute to the development of a high degree of
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collegiality and collective identity among ofﬁcials (e.g. Juncos & Pomorska,
2011). Beyers and Dierickx (1998) contend that nationality – while remaining
important in many respects – is diluted in the Council as a supranational
network develops in juxtaposition to the intergovernmental characteristics
of agents. In the context of the Council of Europe, Checkel (2003) has also
found that social agents go ‘native’, to some extent.
With regard to liaison ofﬁcers of national parliaments, the question is thus
whether they remain the ‘agents’ of their parliaments after they arrive in Brus-
sels, or whether a collective identity of liaison ofﬁcers starts to replace national
ties.
Thus, for each concept there are certain features that have to be present
(Table 1). Shared notions of validity, close ties and expertise are necessary
for epistemic communities. For an information network, the emphasis lies
on knowledge and information exchange. An information network thus
requires liaison ofﬁcers to have less in common than an epistemic commu-
nity. While we adhere to the hypothesis that liaison ofﬁcers have recognised
expertise and competence in a particular domain – in this case parliamentary
affairs – epistemic communities in addition share normative and principled
beliefs and have shared notions of validity (Clemens & Cook, 1999, p. 446;
Haas, 1992, p. 5). In the following we shall put these notions to the test and
establish the precise nature of the work of liaison ofﬁcers and their network.
The national parliamentary representatives: rationale and tasks
The development of the network of liaison ofﬁcers: towards an
epistemic community?
The network of liaison ofﬁcers started in the early 1990s but was initially slow
to grow from one representative to include representatives from (almost) all
national parliaments in 2015 (Figure 1).5 The Danish parliament was the
‘forerunner’, having sent a parliamentary representative to Brussels since
1991. It was the ﬁrst legislature to deal with EU issues quite intensively
Table 1. Core elements of the concepts.
Information
network
Epistemic
communities
Expertise x x
Regular contacts to sending institution x (x)
Facilitation of contacts x x
Emphasis on information gathering x (x)
Close and durable ties x
Shared beliefs, values and practices especially related to
policy issues
x
Notes: x indicates qualities that have to be present for the network of liaison ofﬁcers to ﬁt into that
concept.
(x) These elements may also be part of the concept, but are not part of its deﬁning features.
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through the mandating of the respective minister in the Council, so this del-
egation of a parliamentary representative to Brussels ‘came rather naturally’
(Interview, IV). The Finnish parliament followed in 1995 in order to obtain
ﬁrst-hand information not provided by the government (Interview, VII).
Italy then followed suit and sent representatives as of 1998, but they were
not based in Brussels permanently but commuted from the Italian capital.
The UK House of Commons delegated a parliamentary representative the
year after.
A large number of liaison ofﬁcers were delegated to the European level just
prior to and after enlargement (2003–2005). This ‘boom’ was, however, only
partially related to enlargement and included also ‘older’ member states such
as Germany, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria (lower chamber) and the
UK (House of Lords). Even Norway has been sending a representative since the
beginning of 2013, which is seen to be based on a political decision to observe EU
activities.
The fact that a vast majority of parliaments of the EU member states and
legislatures of non-member states currently send a parliamentary representa-
tive to the European arena can be seen as a clear indication that legislatures
see it as vital to be part of this network, even in times of ﬁnancial crisis,
where one might assume that administrative cost would be reduced. Several
bicameral parliaments such as the UK and Belgium send two representatives,
one per chamber.
Parliamentary representatives are ofﬁcials of their respective parliament
and most have worked for their legislature for several years prior to having
been delegated to Brussels. It is seen as vital that the liaison ofﬁcer has
Figure 1. The total number of liaison ofﬁcers per year (including both upper and lower
houses).
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roots in the respective national parliament; ‘how could you exercise your func-
tion effectively if you are not a civil servant from parliament? One needs to
know the parliament from within and to know what is key’ (Interview, IXX).
Liaison ofﬁcers are recalled after a few years (normally two) and keep their
allegiance to their sending institution, as their career prospects are determined
by the perception of their performance by national actors. As such there is a
high ﬂuctuation within the group itself and this thus prevents the establish-
ment of durable links among actors. The effect of the strong socialisation
by way of the sending institution on the other hand is that liaison ofﬁcers
indeed form a group of experts in parliamentary concerns in EU politics,
but it is a group marked primarily by national ties and mandates. The parlia-
mentary context that liaison ofﬁcers work in on the national level varies
widely:
The group of liaison ofﬁcers is naturally quite a disparate group, with different
mandates, representing different chambers. As we are aware of this heterogen-
eity one cooperates in areas where there are ‘real’ beneﬁts. (Interview, XXI)
This is a key observation shaping the work performed by liaison ofﬁcers. On
the one hand even if we only focus on one aspect of parliamentary control, the
implementation of the Lisbon provisions into the practical political process,
we come across great heterogeneity:
After Lisbon, most parliaments adopted new laws for parliamentary scrutiny
and/or amended their rules of procedure to clarify the procedure of reasoned
opinions and enhance information rights. The result is a highly heterogeneous
collection of practices for the subsidiarity checks and the political dialogue
across the 28 member states. (Mastenbroek et al., 2014, p. 26)
Moreover, ‘role conceptions’, the role that national parliaments should play
within EU affairs, differ widely across member states and sometimes even
across chambers (for example, in the Netherlands) (Mastenbroek et al.,
2014, p. 21). Whereas some parliaments such as Finland, for example,
direct parliamentary scrutiny and control towards the respective ministers
in the Council, others focus more on the political dialogue with the Commis-
sion (such as Portugal) or towards the EP. Others combine strategies of par-
liamentary control. These role conceptions but also the different
parliamentary tools available for parliamentary scrutiny have an impact on
the way liaison ofﬁcers conceive and perform their role.
In addition, the neutrality of the liaison ofﬁcers and their non-partisan role
is stressed time and again (Interview, I; Interview, XI; Interview, XV; Inter-
view, XX; Interview, XXII). One ofﬁcial (Interview, XX) brings it to the
point by saying:
What you have to realize we are civil servants. I have a permanent position and
I passed a Concours. I work for any political group and I am part of the staff of
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parliament; working for the house. I am not affected by elections but will stay in
parliament. We deal with technical issues and we do not pre-cook any issues in
any way. (Interview, XX)
Liaison ofﬁcers thus tend to act on the basis of formal mandates and positions,
such as parliamentary or committee resolutions, opinions and mandates
(depending on the precise system of parliamentary scrutiny) and are cautious
when it comes to interpreting formal positions of their parliament and com-
mittees (Interview, XX).
The close ties with the sending institution – and not with the group of
national parliaments as a whole – has a threefold effect on the role of
liaison ofﬁcers:
. Close contacts within the respective legislature as an information broker:
representatives set up their ‘own channels’ they can tap into when requir-
ing information on speciﬁc, sectoral issues, but also ﬁrst-hand information
on subsidiarity checks. The familiarity of the liaison ofﬁcers both with staff
and members of parliament (MPs) also ensures a high degree of trust and
familiarity (Interview, XV; Interview, XVII).
. Comprehensive insight into the respective legislative and political system:
as systems of parliamentary control are not only rather complex but also
have their unique ways of functioning even when they are modelled on
other parliamentary systems (O’Brennan & Raunio, 2007), it is key that
the liaison ofﬁcer is very much aware of how the respective political
system works and which players are responsible for which type of issues
at which stage of the policy process.
. (Administrative) Spokesperson on behalf of the respective parliament: the
fact that liaison ofﬁcers are rooted within their respective legislature
enables them to speak on behalf of their legislature on an administrative
level, not only when it comes to national counterparts of parliamentary
representatives but also as regards to EU institutions such as the Commis-
sion and the EP. One EAC [European Affairs Committee] clerk (Interview,
XIX) brings it to the point by characterising the respective liaison ofﬁcer as
‘our eyes and ears on speciﬁc topics that we deﬁne as priorities. For
example, if we have a debate here in the House we can ask him to talk
to MEPs or the Commission and he does that’.
Overall, the review of the background of liaison ofﬁcers demonstrates two
things. On the one hand, liaison ofﬁcers share a common background and
have a high level of expertise in parliamentary affairs, which would be in
line with the concept of an epistemic community. On the other hand, their
ties to their sending institutions are very close and remain very close through-
out their time in Brussels. Despite their similar background, they thus remain
primarily ‘national agents’ with a past and future in the service of the national
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parliament, which is more in line with the idea of an information network.
This also becomes apparent when reviewing the tasks that liaison ofﬁcers
perform.
Tasks of individual liaison ofﬁcers across levels of governance
The tasks of liaison ofﬁcers are manifold and span several levels of EU govern-
ance as follows:
. Liaison ofﬁcers work as an ‘information relay’ to their respective national
legislature and uphold links to the respective national parliament.
. They function as a contact point to the EU institutions and as such foster
information exchange.
. They assist MPs in exercising their representational function and contrib-
ute to ‘best practice exchanges’ across national parliaments.
Information relay to the respective national parliament. Several liaison ofﬁ-
cers describe their function as being the ‘eyes, ears and mouth’ for their
respective parliament and as such to function as an ‘information relay’ or
‘information broker’ for their respective legislature (Interview, X; Interview,
XVI; Interview, XV; Interview, IXX). One interviewee brings it to the point
by saying:
In exercising my functions, I depend on the Secretariat General and my ‘main
client’ is the EAC … it is the liaison ofﬁcer that keeps bilateral contacts with
sectoral committees and steers and assists them when it comes to the selection
of priority dossiers for parliamentary scrutiny and to alert them to what is hap-
pening at the European level. (Interview, IXX)
The main objectives pursued by the liaison ofﬁcers are thus directed towards
the monitoring of European affairs by assisting ‘their’ directly elected
members in exercising democratic control (Interview, XV). On the one
hand this implies that liaison ofﬁcers assume a key role in information proces-
sing and in framing what is relevant for the respective national parliament as
regards to EU affairs. The Commission sends a plethora of documents to par-
liaments under the Barroso initiative and liaison ofﬁcers contribute to the
identiﬁcation of issues that are to be subject to parliamentary control. In
this quest, information has to be tailor-made to parliament’s needs (Interview,
XX; Pinheiro, 2012, p. 212). It is conceded that the government also provides
information ‘but you hear and see more when you are in Brussels’ (Interview,
X) and this sets the basis for a network of contacts. In parliaments that select
priority dossiers for scrutiny, it is the liaison ofﬁcer who keeps bilateral con-
tacts with sectoral committees and steers and assists them in the selection of
priority dossiers for parliamentary scrutiny and as such ‘supplying data for the
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scrutiny activities of the parliament’ (President of the Portuguese Parliament,
2008). In this quest it is the task of the liaison ofﬁcers to collect information on
EU draft laws for the respective national parliament, at an early stage of
policy-making, and where relevant to share this with political groups and sec-
toral committees (Mastenbroek et al., 2015, p. 90).
Upholding links with the respective parliament. This task is closely linked to
the function outlined above. A large number of liaison ofﬁcers, such as the
Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Austrian, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, Dutch and
the representatives of the French National Assembly and of the UK House
of Commons, go back to their member state parliament around once a
month, primarily with the objective of information exchange; conveying
developments from the EU arena to the national level and vice versa. In
this context liaison ofﬁcers attend staff meetings of ofﬁcials working for sec-
toral committees and the EAC and provide reports on EU affairs. For
example, the liaison ofﬁcer of the House of Commons writes a weekly
policy brieﬁng for the EU Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons
(Interview, XXI).
At the same time this provides representatives with a prime opportunity to
keep abreast with political developments within their respective national
parliaments.
Several liaison ofﬁcers describe their respective committee responsible for
European affairs and where relevant the secretariat general as their ‘main’ or
‘primary clients’ they have to see at regular intervals (Interview, XV; Inter-
view, XVII). There is a trend, however, that in member states that have
joined the EU more recently this direct relay function has been reduced.
When the Lithuanian liaison ofﬁcer started in 2008, for example, she went
back home every six months, but this was cut after the crisis. Most of the con-
tacts now take place via email, phone and videoconference. The permanent
representative of the Polish Sejm seldom goes back to the Polish parliament
and keeps in touch mainly via email (Interview, XVI; Interview, XVII).
Contact point to the EU institutions. The work of the liaison ofﬁcers also
has an important European dimension and as such contacts to the three
main institutions involved in EU policy-making are seen as crucial. Legisla-
tures thus enter into direct dialogue with the EU institutions without the
mediation of their national governments (Pinheiro, 2012). The link to the
EP and the informal political dialogue are highlighted as being vital in this
respect. Even from a logistical perspective there is a direct link to the EP as
liaison ofﬁcers are based within the premises of the EP.
Owing to the fact that the EWM is very much focused on contacts between
national parliaments and the Commission, liaison ofﬁcers also uphold intense
contacts with the European executive, also in the quest of information
exchange. This network spans all layers of the European executive centre
(Bauer, 2009): European Commission ofﬁcials, the secretariat general of the
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Commission, cabinet members and commissioners. The latter are interested
‘in us liaison ofﬁcers and see us as a new phenomenon’ (Interview, XVIII).
This is reﬂected by the fact that not only representatives of the services of
the Commission but also commissioners themselves attend the weekly meet-
ings of liaison ofﬁcers (Interview, V). The EU executive thus sees the beneﬁt of
exchanging information with a larger audience, i.e. a network of ofﬁcials del-
egated by national parliaments (Interview, XXI).
Moreover, representatives ensure cooperation with their respective perma-
nent representation to the European Union and try to systematise these con-
tacts (Interview, XXI). Contacts to COSAC as a coordinating forum of the
position of national parliaments are simpliﬁed by the fact that COSAC is
located within the same building as the liaison ofﬁcers. Members of the
COSAC Secretariat also attend the regular meetings of the liaison ofﬁcers
and liaison ofﬁcers are part of COSAC during the period when their respective
member state is part of the troika (Interview, IV). COSAC is thus seen as an
‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ partner, where the exchange of information is
described as a two-way street: liaison ofﬁcers are an ‘excellent source of infor-
mation of what is actually going on in national parliaments’ (Interview, V).
Representational function and fostering of best practices. Moreover, liaison
ofﬁcers are involved in the representation of national parliaments at the Euro-
pean level, in a supporting function. It might come as a surprise that we shed
light on this issue when it comes to the role of ofﬁcials but the representative
function of national parliaments is an important element of legislatures within
the multi-level parliamentary ﬁeld (Crum & Fossum, 2009).
We thus probed the question whether ofﬁcials also play a role in assisting
‘their’ MPs. On the one hand liaison ofﬁcers thus provide support to their
respective parliamentary president and to the delegations of their respective
parliament when attending meetings of the EU institutions. They also partici-
pate in the organisation of work and study visits of members and parliamen-
tary ofﬁcials to the European institutions (Interview, X; Interview, XXI). On
the other hand, the ‘relay function’ of liaison ofﬁcers also implies that they
accompany representatives of the EU institutions, such as the president of
the EP or commissioners, when visiting their respective parliament and
when they attend plenary or committee meetings (Interview, XV; Interview,
XVII).
Moreover, due to the fact that liaison ofﬁcers have a comprehensive insight
into the way their ‘own’ legislature works, they regularly exchange best prac-
tices both informally and formally. As such they thus turn into ‘ambassadors’
of their respective legislative system.6
Overall, the review of the tasks of the liaison ofﬁcers highlights information
gathering and the interpretation of information as pertaining to their main
role, followed by the facilitation of contacts with the European institutions
and other Brussels actors (Table 2). The representational function of
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parliamentary representatives is comparatively weak. The liaison ofﬁcers see
themselves as administrators who are not to negotiate, deliberate or decide
on behalf of their parliament. This is a further indication that they are an
information network rather than an epistemic community.
Overall, one has to stress the fact parliaments and chambers consider the
liaison ofﬁcers in Brussels as a very useful instrument. The Czech Senát
and Latvia even consider the liaison ofﬁcers as one of the most useful proac-
tive tools for general national parliamentary involvement in EU policy-
making (COSAC, 2013).
The role of liaison ofﬁcers in the practical political process
Building on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty as a legal basis, liaison ofﬁcers
have derived a common task for themselves, which is the exchange of infor-
mation on the stance of their respective parliament towards a possible breach
of the principle of subsidiarity in real time (Interview, I; Interview, XXI):
For example when it comes to the cooperation with the Commission the group
is seen as beneﬁcial as both ofﬁcials and Commissioners will see the beneﬁt of
exchanging information with a larger audience. In terms of subsidiarity the fact
that there is a network of ofﬁcials also fosters exchange. The group’s ‘peps’ is
seen in the exchange of information rather than necessarily reaching the
threshold. (Interview, XXI)
The advantage of the information network of liaison ofﬁcers over other forms
of parliamentary cooperation such as COSAC is that it functions by way of
regular meetings, held on Monday mornings, which have become known as
Monday morning meetings (MMMs) (Interview, III; Interview, XI; Interview,
XIII). These meetings are a forum for information exchange where national
legislatures are alerted to the fact that one or more legislatures are planning
to conduct a subsidiarity check even before the Commission formally
comes up with a proposal (Interview, XIII). The meetings are also a hub for
Table 2. The network of liaison ofﬁcers compared with different concepts.
Information
network
Epistemic
communities
Empirical
ﬁndings
Expertise x x x
Regular contacts to sending institution x (x)a x
Facilitation of contacts x x x
Emphasis on information gathering x (x)a x
Close and durable ties x (x)b
Shared beliefs, values and practices especially
related to policy issues
x
aThese criteria may also be part of the concept, but are not one of its deﬁning features.
bThese criteria are liaison ofﬁcers only meet this criterion in a limited way: the representative function is
closely circumscribed by national mandates, whereas the ties between liaison ofﬁcers are close at a
given point in time, but not necessarily durable, as they are for the most part recalled every few years.
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the exchange of best practices of parliamentary control (Interview, XIV). Finally,
the meetings work as a ‘conduit’ for regular input and exchange of views of
external actors; for example, Commission ofﬁcials presenting an upcoming pro-
posal or ofﬁcials of EP sectoral committees giving presentations.7
In addition, the fact that the liaison ofﬁcers work on the same ﬂoor in the
EP fosters informal information exchange. One does not need to wait for
formal meetings. If one is in need of speciﬁc information or the position of
a respective legislature on a speciﬁc issue ‘you just go down the corridor’
(Interview, XVI). All liaison ofﬁcers have an ofﬁce within the premises of
the EP. Only the German delegation uses ofﬁce space outside the EP, as it
also comprises representatives of the political groups8 (Interview, XIV).
A good example to illustrate the impact of the network is the so-called
Monti II regulation,9 which would have affected the right to organise collec-
tive industrial action. The Monti II regulation was to address the fact that
around a million workers are posted to another European country by their
employers in order to provide temporary service on a yearly basis. The pro-
posed regulation immediately provoked strong opposition among trade
unions and employers (Petitjean, 2012).
During the eight weeks following publication of the proposal, 12 national
parliaments representing 19 votes ﬂagged up problems of the proposed regu-
lation with the principle of subsidiarity and issued reasoned opinions, which
led to the ﬁrst ‘yellow card’ procedure.
The role of the liaison ofﬁcers in Monti II was twofold. In the ﬁrst instance,
the Danish parliament used their liaison ofﬁcer to mobilise other parliaments.
The Danish parliament had already earmarked Monti II on its list of priorities
for subsidiarity control as it was likely to affect the Danish welfare system. It
was thus very quick to formulate a reasoned opinion within the ﬁrst few weeks
of the procedure. It was a short but clear statement of the main concerns and
was translated into English. The Danish liaison ofﬁcer pushed very proactively
for more reasoned opinions by circulating the Danish reasoned opinion as a
‘blueprint’ to the network of liaison ofﬁcers in order for other legislatures to
follow suit (Interviews, XXV, XXVI).
Coincidentally, Denmark also held the COSAC presidency and the meeting
of the delegates of EACs was conveniently timed. The Danish EAC chair
could thus use that meeting to push further for reasoned opinions among
directly elected MPs (cf. Buskjær Christensen, 2014), but the Danish EU
advisor estimates that at that point most of the coordination work was
already done (Interview, XXV).
After getting the process off the ground, the network of liaison ofﬁcers used
the catalyst effect of the increasing number of opinions: by keeping the parlia-
ments regularly informed about the progress towards the card, they triggered
interest in ever more parliaments (Interviews, XXIV, XXVII). The Dutch
decision to adopt a reasoned opinion on the last day, for example, was probably
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motivated in part by the fact that the card was within reach, and in part by the
strong mobilisation of trade unions (Interview, XXVI). The example reﬂects the
fact that information on the proceedings en grand can trigger action and lead to
concerted outcomes that could otherwise not have been achieved (Cooper, 2013;
House of Lords, 2014; Interview, XV; Interview, XXV).
The second yellow card was reached on the proposal regarding a European
Prosecutor Ofﬁce in 2013. In this case, the Dutch were very active as they
had selected the issue as a priority on the basis of the Commission work pro-
gramme a year in advance. Thus, the Dutch liaison ofﬁcer alerted the other par-
liaments to the publication of the proposal and informed them of the Dutch
intention to adopt a reasoned opinion. She followed the ‘model’ set by the
Danish on the ﬁrst yellow card and proactively informed the network about
the Dutch activities on the dossier and asked for information on the stance of
other legislatures in return. They also beneﬁted from the interest of other
active parliaments, such as the UK parliament (Interview, XXVI).
The ‘bandwagon effect’ can be illustrated by the fact that Denmark nearly
adopted a reasoned opinion, despite the fact that it has an opt-out of Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA) and would thus not be affected by the proposal in
any event. As one EU advisor (Interview, XXV) stated:
But due to our JHA opt-out, we felt that we could not send a reasoned opinion,
as the proposal did not affect us due to the opt-out. If it were not for the opt-
out, we would probably have sent one. Our liaison ofﬁcer also played a role in
that. He informed us about the mood for the second yellow card and we got a
question via him from the UK if we would be interested in adopting a yellow
card. That is what motivated us to discuss the proposal.
The role of the liaison ofﬁcers was furthermore to assist the relevant commit-
tees with the procedure of adopting the yellow card, by, for example, keeping
them informed of approaching deadlines (Interview, XXIV).
Overall, the two examples thus further illustrate how the network of liaison
ofﬁcers functions. In the ﬁrst instance, in line with the concept of an information
network, by circulating information between parliaments, liaison ofﬁcers con-
tributed to facilitating the activities of their own parliament by procuring blue-
prints of reasoned opinions as well as up-to-date information on the building of
momentum for a card. By way of functioning as administrative spokespeople of
their parliaments, they thus facilitate the attainment of common solutions.
Concluding remarks
As highlighted, the network of liaison ofﬁcers performs the function of an
‘information relay’ both towards the respective national legislature and
across other national parliaments. It is in the very nature of the Lisbon pro-
visions that a certain degree of coordination between national parliaments
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is needed in order to raise subsidiarity concerns. In practice, this coordination
takes place mainly on a bureaucratic, not on a political, level. Ofﬁcials can thus
raise the attention of decision-makers to issues of political importance.
However, this importance does not stem from any direct lobbying function
or decision-making powers. The network of liaison ofﬁcers has an impact on
informational asymmetries between EU institutions and national parliaments
and governments and parliaments. Moreover, it is seen as the most routine
channel of communication between parliaments. The main functions this
network performs are thus: to enable effective scrutiny within a parliament
and to enable the effective use of the EWM collectively.
At the same time, despite the frequent and institutionalised interactions by
way of MMMs and exchange of information in the corridors and ofﬁces of the
EP, the network does not form an epistemic community. Liaison ofﬁcers are
sent by the same type of institution, but they remain too closely connected to
their respective national institutions to develop common beliefs and interpret-
ations. Even after the Lisbon Treaty, the attachment to national mandates and
the culture of the sending institution prevail.
Liaison ofﬁcers thus have recognised expertise and competence in a par-
ticular domain – in this case parliamentary affairs. This would be one aspect
of an epistemic community; however, here professionals actually share nor-
mative and principled beliefs and notions of validity. This seems not to be
the case for liaison ofﬁcers. On the one hand we have to point to the fact
that tools, procedures and resources available for parliamentary scrutiny
differ widely across member states and sometimes even among chambers.
On the other hand, ‘role conceptions’ (Mastenbroek et al., 2014, p. 21) of
the role national parliaments should play in EU affairs also differ. This
shapes the way liaison ofﬁcers perceive and exercise their role and tasks.
Moreover, as opposed to epistemic communities, liaisons cannot develop
durable and long-standing ties as they are called back to their sending insti-
tution after around two years. The ﬂuctuation of ofﬁcials within the network
is thus high.
Overall, liaison ofﬁcers are protagonists of multi-level governance in action.
They are not policy experts per se but ofﬁcials who guard the role of their
respective parliament and at the same time contribute to concerted outcomes
across national legislatures. Their closely-knit network can best be seen as an
information network that aims to enable legislative scrutiny and control on
behalf of both individual parliaments and parliaments collectively.
Notes
1. For more insights on parliamentary administrations in the EU and an evalu-
ation of the network of liaisons in comparison to other networks of parliamen-
tary ofﬁcials, please see Högenauer et al. (2016).
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2. The questions asked ranged from the daily tasks that the respective liaisons
fulﬁl to how they keep in touch with their respective national legislature and
the nature of the meetings of liaison ofﬁcers.
3. These questionnaires were ﬁlled in by country experts as part the OPAL project
and contained quantitative data; for example, the question of since when the
respective national parliament delegates a representative to Brussels.
4. If the draft legislative act is about the area of freedom, security and justice
(Article 76 TFEU), this threshold will be 1⁄4.
5. The position for the Slovak and Bulgarian parliament is currently vacant. This
is, however, to be ﬁlled again.
6. A seminar was held, for example, on 11 December 2014 in Brussels where aca-
demics and liaisons exchanged insights on how national parliaments exercise
control of EU decision-making after the Lisbon Treaty. This seminar was
organised by the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the Dutch parliamentary represen-
tation in Brussels.
7. For a long time the Dutch parliament got relevant LIMITE (conﬁdential)
documents from other parliaments that had access to them.
8. Note that only the Bundesländer and the main German political parties have
their own representatives in Brussels, but so does the Bundestag as an insti-
tution. The liaison ofﬁce in Brussels is part of Desk PE 2/European Affairs
(Mastenbroek et al., 2014).
9. Proposal for a Council regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective
action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to
provide services, Brussels, 21.3.2012 COM(2012) 130 ﬁnal.
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